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"any dispute," and the Court had no trouble in finding this
included an action in rem. It is submitted that this distinction
was made in Carbon Black to avoid facing the issue of the
enforceability of forum selection clauses.40 In light of the ap-
proval given forum clauses in the instant case, courts should be
dissuaded from indulging in hypertechnical analysis of the
language used, and enforce the clause whether it reads "any
dispute" or merely "any action against the owner." The parties'
inclusion of such a clause should indicate an intention to pro-
vide an exclusive forum for settling their differences, and
admiralty courts have realized in other contexts that an action
against the ship is an action against the owner.41
Harold Watson
THE DOMINANT MOTIVATION STANDARD FOR
BUSINESS BAD DEBT DEDUCTIONS
Taxpayer was president of a closely held construction cor-
poration in which he owned 44% of the outstanding stock, repre-
senting an original investment of $33,900.1 He had signed an
indemnity agreement required by the bonding company which
furnished the necessary performance bonds for construction
contracts. After the corporation defaulted in its performance
of two contracts, taxpayer indemnified the bonding company to
the extent of more than $162,000 for which he was not reim-
bursed. Taxpayer claimed the indemnification loss as a business
bad debt and deducted it from ordinary income on his federal
tion was retained on the basis suggested above in cases involving a con-
tractual limitation of actions. See Loomis v. S.S. Santa Rosa, 447 F.2d 105
(9th Cir. 1971); Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 388
F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968). One district court even went so far as to say that
Carbon Black stood for the proposition that such a clause could not bar an
action in rem. Amicale Industries v. S.S. Rantum, 259 F. Supp. 534 (D. S.C.
1966). Peugeot v. S.S. Honestas, In Admiralty No. 8086 (E.D. Va., Nov. 10,
1959), also contains language which might support this proposition.
40. See the dissent of Justice Harlan in Carbon Black, 359 U.S. at 184.
41. See, e.g., Continental Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
1. Taxpayer also held a full time position as president of a savings and
loan association from which he received a salary of $19,000. Taxpayer's ser-
vices to the construction corporation, to which he devoted no more than six
to eight hours per week, included reviewing bids, making cost estimates,
obtaining performance bonds and bank financing. The son-in-law of the
taxpayer also owned 44% of the corporation's outstanding stock, while the
remaining 12% was owned by a son of the taxpayer and by another son-in-
law.
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income tax return. He later filed a claim for a refund asserting
a net loss carryback under § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code
for the portion of the unused business bad debt.2 In the trial of
the refund suit, the court held that significant motivation satis-
fies the requirement of a proximate relationship between the
debt and the trade or business of the taxpayer.$ The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.4 The Supreme Court
on certiorari held that in determining whether a bad debt is
proximately related to the taxpayer's trade or business and
thus qualifies as a business bad debt, the proper measure is
that of dominant motivation.5 United States v. Generes, 92 S. Ct.
827 (1972).
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942, the Internal Revenue
Code did not distinguish between business and nonbusiness bad
debts. Both were deductible in full against ordinary income.6
The result was abuse of the deduction for nonbusiness bad debts
by taxpayers who made loans they did not expect to be repaid.
In response to these abuses,7 Congress created in the Revenue
Act of 1942 a special classification and treatment of nonbusiness
bad debts.
The characterization of a debt as a business or nonbusiness
bad debt is of importance to the taxpayer because business bad
debts may be deducted in full against ordinary income in the
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 172 allows the taxpayer whose business de-
ductions exceed his business gross income to carry the loss back three years.
3. Generes v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9754 (E.D. La. 1967).
4. United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970).
5. Certiorari was granted to resolve a conflict among the circuits, 401
U.S. 972 (1971). Compare Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.
1963) and United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970), with Niblock
v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Oddee Smith, 55
T.C. 260 (1970), where the United States Tax Court applied the significant
motivation test In compliance with the ruling of Generes in order to promote
efficient judicial administration.
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(k), 53 Stat. 13.
7. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1942): "C. NONnusiNESs
BAD DEBTs. The present law gives the same tax treatment to bad debts in-
curred in nonbusiness transactions as It allows to business bad debts. An
example of a nonbusiness bad debt would be an unrepaid loan to a friend
or relative, while business bad debts arise In the course of the taxpayer's
trade or business. This liberal allowance for nonbusiness bad debts had
suffered considerable abuse through taxpayers making loans which they do
not expect to be repaid .... This situation has presented serious administra-
tive difficulties because of the requirement of proof." See also Putnam v.
Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956), where the Supreme Court extended the
purpose of § 166 to include the placing of nonbusiness investments in the
form of loans on a footing with other nonbusiness investments.
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year they arise and deductions are allowed for either total or
partial worthlessness of such debts." On the other hand, non-
business bad debts are treated as short term capital losses and
are deductible only when totally worthless.9
To establish the existence of a business bad debt, the tax-
payer must prove that there is a true indebtedness,0 that the
debt became worthless in the taxable year," and that the debt
was acquired in connection with the trade or business of the
taxpayer. 2 Thus, the taxpayer must establish first that he is
engaged in a trade or business and, second, that there is a con-
nection between that business and the debt.-3 The Treasury
Regulations specify that a debt is to be characterized as a busi-
ness bad debt only if there is a proximate relationship between
the loss resulting from the debt becoming worthless and the
8. INT. Rsv. CODE of 1954, § 166(a).
9. Id. § 166(d). As a result, deductions are allowed only to the extent
of gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets plus the taxable income
for the year or $1,000, whichever is smaller.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c) (1969), specifies that only a bona fide debt
qualifies for purposes of § 166, defining a bona fide debt as one which arises
from a debtor-creditor relationship based on a valid obligation to pay a
fixed sum of money. In the situation where a stockholder employee makes
a loan to his closely held corporation, the loan may be held to represent
a contribution to capital under which the loss is considered to result from
the worthlessness of stock and is treated as a loss from the sale or exchange
of such stock in the last day of the taxable year in which the worthlessness
occurs. INT. Rsv. CODE of 1954, § 165(g)(1).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(a) (1959).
12. INT. Rsv. CODE of 1954, § 166(d)(2) provides that a nonbusiness debt
Is one other than "(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in
connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or (B) a debt the loss
from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness." In Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 85 (1956), the Supreme
Court ruled that "the loss sustained by the guarantor unable to recover from
the debtor Is by its very nature a loss from the worthlessness of a debt."
13. In Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963), the Supreme Court
enunciated the well-established rule that where loans are incurred merely
In connection with or for the purpose of protecting an investment in a cor-
poration, they may not be regarded as business loans. Earlier cases allowed
taxpayer to qualify for ordinary loss deductions if the loan arose in the
taxpayer's business of promoting, organizing, financing and selling corporate
enterprises. Skarda v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957); Giblin
v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955); Commissioner v. Stokes'
Estate, 200 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1953); Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 183
F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1950); Henry E. Sage, 15 T.C. 299 (1950); Vincent C. Camp-
bell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948).
In Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961), the court held
that being an employee may be considered as being in a trade or business
for purposes of a business bad debt deduction under INT. REV. CODs of 1954,
§ 166, just as it is for purposes of § 162(a) (business expenses) and §
172(d) (4) (net operating loss deductions).
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trade or business of the taxpayer. 14 The question of whether a
debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in each case15
and the burden of proof as to the business or nonbusiness char-
acter of a debt is upon the taxpayer."'
Because the taxpayer who claims a business bad debt deduc-
tion must prove motivation to protect his employment'7 rather
than his investment in a corporation, the dual status of the
taxpayer who is both a shareholder and employee of a cor-
poration increases the difficulty of establishing the requisite
proximate relationship between the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness and his advances to the corporation. 8 Evidence of the tax-
payer's protection and management of his investment is set off
against evidence of job protection. Thus the problem arises as to
the degree of motivation which can be attributed to investment
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2) (1959): "[T]he character of the debt is
to be determined by the relation which the loss resulting from the debt's
becoming worthless bears to the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that
relation is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business in which
the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless, the debt
comes within the exception provided by that subparagraph."
The Supreme Court, in Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 201 (1963),
indicated its approval of the Treasury Regulations when it noted that the
purpose of the amendment which distinguished between business and non-
business bad debts was to "make full deductibility of a bad debt turn upon
its proximate connection with activities which the tax laws recognized as
a trade or business, a concept which falls short of reaching every income
or profit making activity."
The interpretative regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
are not controlling on the courts which may construe and apply the statutory
provisions of the revenue laws independent of the Regulations. Neverthe-
less, the courts accord substantial weight to Regulations which are reason-
able and consistent with the revenue statutes. For an excellent analysis of
the communications issued by the Internal Revenue Service, see "The Four
R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity-A View from With-
in," an address presented by Mitchell Rogovin, former chief Counsel of the
Internal Revenue Service, at the 18th Tax Conference of the University of
Chicago Law School, 6 CCH 1972 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5980A.015.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b) (2) (1959).
16. Spillers v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1969); Kelly v. Pat-
terson, 331 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Byck, 325 F.2d 551 (5th
Cir. 1963).
17. In Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961), the court held
that being an employee may be considered as being in a trade or business
for purposes of a business bad debt deduction under INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 166(d) (2) (A).
18. In Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963), the Supreme
Court cautioned that "[elven if the taxpayer demonstrates an independent
trade or business of his own, care must be taken to distinguish bad debt
losses arising from his own business and those actually arising from activi-
ties peculiar to an investor concerned with, and participating in, the con-
duct of corporate business."
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protection before the taxpayer will be disqualified from bad
debt deduction.
Two conflicting tests arose in the courts of appeal as to the
degree of motivation necessary to qualify the loss from a debt
as being proximately related to the taxpayer's trade or business.
The Seventh Circuit took the views that the test must be that
of dominant motivation, requiring that the taxpayer seeking
to obtain a deduction for a business bad debt prove that his
corporate employment furnished the dominant and primary mo-
tivation for making advances and guarantees to the corpora-
tion.19 On the other hand, the Second Circuit adopted a test of
significant motivation in Weddle v. Commissioner,20 basing its
choice upon a tort analysis of the word "proximate" used in the
Regulations to describe the requisite degree of relationship.
The court reasoned that "[i]n the law of torts where the notion
of 'proximate' causation is most frequently encountered, a cause
contributing to a harm may be found 'proximate' despite the
fact that it might have been secondary to another contributing
cause."21 The Fifth Circuit in Generes adopted the reasoning
of the majority in Weddle, allowing the taxpayer to recover
upon a showing of significant motivation.22
The Supreme Court resolved this conflict by holding in
Generes that the proper test of a proximate relationship is that
of dominant motivation. The majority opinion noted that prior
decisions distinguishing between business and nonbusiness bad
debts have taken a "cautious and not a free-wheeling approach to
19. Niblock v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
20. Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963).
21. Id. at 851. In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Lumbard disagreed
with the court's choice of a significant motivation standard and urged that
the taxpayer be required to prove that he was primarily motivated by a
desire to protect his employment. He rejected the tort notion of proximate
cause as being of little value due to the inapplicability of such factors as
time, space, foreseeability and causation In fact to a problem requiring an
analysis of different motivations directed at a similar objective. Also he
reasoned that the application of the significant motivation test to a stock-
holder-employee who has made loans to the corporation would inevitably
result In a judgment for the taxpayer who will always be motivated by a
desire to protect both his employment and his investment. Id. at 852.
22. United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Oddee
Smith, 55 T.C. 260 (1970), where the United States Tax Court applied the
significant motivation test approved by the Fifth Circuit because the case
arose in that circuit although it was the opinion of the court that the test
of primary and dominant motivation should apply to the creation of a busi-
ness bad debt. See also Walton M. Dallas, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1071 (1971).
[VCol. 33
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the business bad debt."' ' Rejecting the tort theory of proximate
cause as inappropriate to the consideration of motivation in
income tax law, the Court listed several reasons for its adoption
of the dominant motivation standard. First, it relied on the
different treatment of business and nonbusiness items in the
Code 24 as indicative of a specific policy to distinguish clearly
between business and nonbusiness items. The Court noted that
this policy distinction would be blunted by the use of the signif-
icant motivation test. The Court also pointed to the judicial
interpretation of loss provisions of the Code25 in which the
deductibility of a loss has been held to depend on the primary
motive of the taxpayer in entering into the transaction. 20 Em-
phasis was placed on the conclusion of the court in Whipple v.
Commissioner27 that a shareholder's activity in the affairs of the
corporation is not a trade or business. Finally, the majority
rested its conclusion on the workability of the dominant motiva-
tion standard, indicating that it provides a "guideline of certainty
for the trier of fact."28
In remanding the Generes case with the direction that a
judgment be entered for the United States, the Court seems to
establish the principle that a taxpayer cannot prove dominant
motivation to protect his salary where his annual after tax
salary is substantially smaller than the amount of his original
investment in the corporation. The Court suggested that in
applying the standard of dominant motivation the trier of fact
may "compare the risk against the potential reward and thereby
23. United States v. Generes, 92 S. Ct. 827, 833 (1972).
24. More specifically, the Court cites § 162 of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
on expenses, § 165 on losses and § 166 on bad debts as examples of distinc-
tions between business and nonbusiness items.
25. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165(c) (1) which limits deductions of indi-
vidual losses to those occurring in a trade or business.
26. Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966); Austin v. Com-
missioner, 298 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1962); Arata v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1960); Ewing v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1954).
27. 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
28. United States v. Generes, 92 S. Ct. 827, 833 (1972). The concurring
opinion of Justice Marshall outlined the legislative history of § 166 of the
Internal Revenue Code in support of the Court's adoption of the dominant
motivation standard. Noting that the aim of Congress in distinguishing be-
tween business and nonbusiness bad debts was to prevent the possibility
that closely held family businesses might gain unwarranted deductions
against ordinary income, Justice Marshall concluded that the instant case
is a perfect example of how the significant motivation test undercuts this
Intended effect by allowing the type of Intra-family loan to the corporation
that Congress intended to prevent.
1973]
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give proper emphasis to the objective rather than to the sub-
jective. '29 Referring to the fact that the taxpayer's stock invest-
ment made with after tax dollars was more than five times
his net salary, the Court concluded that a reasonable man could
not attribute to the taxpayer a dominant motivation of preserv-
ing his salary.
It is submitted that a mechanical comparison of the amount
of the taxpayer's investment in the corporation with the amount
of his net salary should not serve as the single qualifying
method of establishing dominant motivation because of the poten-
tial for abuse, particularly in closely held corporations where
there is often a unilateral determination of salary made by the
stockholder-employee. For example, the salary of the taxpayer
may include not only compensation for his services but may
be formulated so as to include a return on his investment.80
While a comparison of the value of the taxpayer's salary with
his investment in the corporation will serve to indicate his mo-
tivation in advancing funds to the corporation, it should be
weighed against the background of the taxpayer's total financial
situation. Other aspects of taxpayer's financial situation were
closely scrutinized by the Court and it is likely that these factors
also influenced the Court in its conclusion that a reasonable
man could not ascribe to the taxpayer a dominant motivation
to protect his salary. One factor considered by the Court was
the employability of the taxpayer, as the Court noted that he
held a full time job as president of a savings and loan cor-
poration."' The Court also took cognizance of the fact that the
taxpayer's income from the debtor corporation was only one-half
29. Id.
30. In such a situation the taxpayer would bear the burden of proving
that the compensation received from the corporation was reasonable. For
an extensive discussion of reasonable compensation cases, see 4A J. MERTENS,
LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 25.68-25.81 (1966).
31. United States v. Generes, 92 S. Ct. 827, 830 (1972). In Isidore Jaffe,
26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1063 (1967), the court assessed the potential employ-
ability of the taxpayers in finding a dominant motivation to protect their
employment where one taxpayer was of an advanced age and the personality
of the second made it difficult to work for an enterprise not subject to his
control. In Niblock v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969), the tax-
payer was held not to be primarily motivated by a desire to protect his
employment where there were no extraordinary circumstances indicating
that his personality would make future employment difficult.
[Vol. 33
NOTES
that of his income from the savings and loan association."
Emphasis was placed on the intra-family nature of the loan,
the Court noting that the taxpayer had a personal interest in
the integrity of the corporation as a source of living for his son
and son-in-law.83 A consideration of these factors along with
others such as the demands of creditors, the past history of
financial dealings of the taxpayer, corporate activities of share-
holders and the number of shareholders will provide flexibility
in the determination of the taxpayer's motivation and thereby
lighten the heavy burden of proof resting on the employee-
stockholder whose dual status necessitates a showing of a
dominant motivation to protect his employment.
Susan Weeks
32. 92 S. Ct. 827, 830 (1972). In B.A. Faucher, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
950 (1970), the court found that taxpayer's primary purpose in advancing
money to the corporation was to protect his employment where the employ-
ment was his only source of income. Also, in Niblock v. Commissioner, 417
F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969), the court concluded that the taxpayer was not
primarily motivated by a desire to protect his salary, noting the fact that
taxpayer received twice the salary from another company by whom he was
employed.
33. Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, noted that if the tax-
payer had simply lent the money to his son-in-law, he could not have de-
ducted the loss as a business bad debt. 92 S. Ct. at 837.
19731
